D
ebt sustainability is an important indicator of the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.
1 Unless fi nancing resources for low-income countries (LICs) are extended significantly and used more effi ciently, achieving both -debt sustainability and the MDGs -may prove to be something akin to squaring the circle.
The main reason why there is a need to reduce debt in LICs is that external debt is a major cause of poverty. External debt affects growth, and growth affects poverty. 2 The link between external debt and growth is established through the investment channel. Debt service diverts budgetary resources from investments needed to support economic growth. 3 In addition, the private sector may be discouraged from investing if governments need to service debt rather than provide a satisfactory environment for investments in such things as good infrastructure. Investors often regard high indebtedness as due to economic problems and bad governance. This is one reason why a highly indebted country does not attract investment. High debt may, moreover, trigger capital fl ight. 
Key Features of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative
It was because traditional debt mechanisms designed to addressing the debt burden of LICs proved incapable of attaining sustainable debt levels that the IMF and the World Bank set up the HIPC Initiative in 1996. While the goal of the original Initiative was to reduce high external debt as a constraint on economic growth, the Enhanced Initiative, established in 1999, sought to provide a viable exit from debt rescheduling, to promote growth, and to free fi nancial resources for more social spending to reduce poverty.
This mechanism establishes the fi rst comprehensive framework for poverty reduction that includes all creditors -multilateral, Paris Club, and other offi cial bilateral and commercial creditors -with the aim of reducing the external debt of the world's poorest and heavily indebted poor countries. Accordingly, the Initiative has established a new paradigm for international action.
First Stage of the HIPC Process
The Initiative breaks down into two stages. The fi rst stage of the Initiative includes a three-year period in which candidate countries are expected to establish the track record needed to qualify for the HIPC Initiative. During this stage the Paris Club provides fl ow rescheduling on Naples terms 5 and other bilateral and commercial creditors should offer at least a similar treatment. The eligibility criteria for the HIPC Initiative are as follows. • HIPCs' per capita income needs to be below US$ 895.
• Eligible countries need to be in receipt of International Development Association (IDA) credits and they are expected to have a strong track record of performance under IMF / World Bank supported programmes.
• HIPCs need to prove a track record in employing strategies focused on poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth rates. A candidate country is expected to develop, in cooperation with civil society, a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).
• The country has to be heavily indebted, i.e. even after full use of traditional debt-relief mechanisms candidate countries would still not be in a position to reach a sustainable external debt level.
Having concluded the fi rst stage, a candidate reaches the so-called decision point, at which the boards of the World Bank and IMF decide, on the basis of a comprehensive debt sustainability analysis (DSA), whether the country has qualifi ed for the Initiative. 7 This analysis would reveal whether the adoption of a Paris Club stock-of-debt operation under Naples terms and comparable treatment by other bilateral and commercial creditors would be suffi cient to attain a sustainable level of external debt. If the country's debt is seen as sustainable, the country would not qualify for the HIPC Initiative. Otherwise, a country would be deemed eligible for assistance under the Initiative.
Second Stage of the HIPC Process
During the second stage of the Initiative, the country concerned establishes a second track record by adopting the policies agreed upon at the decision point. Paris Club creditors would provide fl ow reschedulings on Cologne terms, 8 and other bilateral and commercial creditors would offer debt relief on comparable terms. IMF and World Bank would supply interim assistance. Other multilateral creditors would supply interim debt relief on a discretionary basis. The duration of the second stage to reach the so-called completion point has not yet been fi xed, but it is contingent on the successful implementation of the PRSPs, Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGFs), as well as on reaching the structural trigger points. These triggers are meant to promote pro-poor growth and to ensure that HIPC countries increase their spending on poverty-reduction measures. They include policy measures in the fi elds of governance, budget management, health, education and agricultural reform.
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At the completion point, all creditors provide debt relief without any further policy conditionality. The fl oating completion point gives good performers the opportunity to reach this point earlier than bad ones. The stock-of-debt operation on Cologne terms committed to by Paris Club creditors would then take effect. Under the Initiative the international community can provide additional debt relief at the completion point beyond that committed at the decision point for the case that there have been any exogenous shocks; this is referred to as topping up.
10 Until September 2004 three countries received additional debt relief: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Niger.
Their high levels of debt and their promising economic policies and poverty-reduction programmes have qualifi ed 27 countries for participation in the HIPC Initiative. By September 2004 a total of 14 countries had completed the Initiative and have thus been accorded comprehensive debt relief. A further 13 countries reached the decision points and have therefore been accepted for participation in the Initiative. However, because of their political instability and some inconsistencies in their PRSPs, 11 countries failed to qualify.
The sunset clause was intended as a means of identifying the end of the Initiative, since moral hazard problems in particular indicate the need to prevent it from becoming a permanent facility. Under this clause, all countries reaching the decision point would be allowed to complete the Initiative. Countries not reaching the decision point would no longer be allowed to take part in the Initiative. Since 1996 the clause has been extended three times. In September 2004, at the annual meetings of the Bretton Woods institutions, the development committee agreed to re-extend the sunset clause by two years until the end of 2006 to give more countries an opportunity to take part in the HIPC Initiative. 
Defi nition of Debt Sustainability
A country's external debt may be seen as sustainable if the country is able to meet all of its current and future debt-service payments without having to restructure its debt, and without impairing its economic growth prospects. Since this defi nition does not include domestic debt, it does not extend to fi scal debt sustainability.
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Even though the main objective of the HIPC Initiative is to help countries to reach sustainable levels of external debt, their ability to repay their debt is greatly infl uenced by their fi scal situation. Domestic debt should therefore be taken into account. The HIPC Initiative should reduce debt-service obligations to a level at which the country concerned is able to meet its debt service without any need for future rescheduling or debt forgiveness.
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Indicators of Debt Sustainability
It is generally diffi cult to identify the "correct" indicators for a given country's debt sustainability. Even assuming that the "correct" indicators are chosen, there are still problems involved in defi ning the "correct" threshold values for a country's debt sustainability.
In general, debt stocks or, alternatively, debt-service payments (numerator) are related to variables that refl ect a country's potential repayment capacity (denominator); the latter may include, for example, gross domestic product (GDP), development of exports or, instead, government revenues.
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In the framework of the enhanced HIPC Initiative, one of two alternative indicators is used to assess debt sustainability.
• A country's debt stock (net present value) is not in excess of 150% of its export earnings.
• Its debt stock (net present value) does not exceed 250% of government revenues. The underlying assumption here is that a country's exports-to-GDP ratio is at least 30% and its ratio of government revenues to GDP is at least 15%.
14 Included in the numerator of an indicator, the debt stock is a variable well suited to measuring the burden represented by debt-service payments. Either the present value or the net present value (NPV) of debt stocks can be used for this purpose. But in view of the fact that a certain share of external credit is provided on concessional terms, the present value is not a suitable variable for measuring a country's debt burden. The net present value is used because it takes account of the degree of loan concessionality involved. The market interest rate is used to discount the sum of all future debt-service obligations (interest and redemption) down to their present value. If the interest rate on a loan is below the commercial level, the net present value of a debt will be lower than its present value. The differential between these two variables is, fi nally, the grant component. While using a small set of simple, practice-oriented indicators is a good way to ensure transparency and fairness, a uniform set of indicators may be unable to refl ect conditions in given countries adequately. Another factor in need of critical review is that the threshold values for participation in the enhanced HIPC Initiative and the possible levels of debt relief are not based on theoretical analyses. Indeed, the threshold values used consist of empirical data derived from the most important IMF and World Bank indicators, which have in the past caused fi nancial diffi culties for many debtors.
Debt-service payments are taken into account in the debt sustainability analysis, but this indicator is not part of the decisive indicator for qualifi cation for the HIPC Initiative. This is the best indicator for measur- 14 See IMF: Annual Report 2001, op. cit. 15 The main problem in calculating net present value is the choice of an appropriate discount rate, since net present value fl uctuates substantially in the wake of changes in discount rates. A discount rate of this kind should be both risk-free and stable and geared to world-market interest rates. It is because of these criteria that interest rates with a fi ve-year term -known as currency-specifi c commercial interest reference rates (CIRRs) -are used for government bonds issued by industrialised countries in secondary markets. Another problem is that, while calculations of net present value indicate future debtservice payments, they do not include factors such as growth rates that infl uence repayment capacity. And while net present value can be used to identify problems associated with debt-service payments, it does not indicate when those problems are likely to occur. See IMF, IDA: Debt Sustainability in Low-Income Countries -Proposal for an Operational Framework and Policy Implications, Washington DC, February 3, 2004. 16 Ibid.
ing the present debt burden. Since many concessional loans specify a multi-year redemption-free period, debt-service payments refl ect only present, not future, debt burdens. 16 Another criticism voiced is that debt-service payments represent only immediate cash fl ows and are therefore infl uenced mainly by the maturity structure of debt.
Domestic and private-sector debt is omitted from the analysis -even though the fi nancial resources mobilised to pay for domestic debt are no longer available to service foreign debt. The fi scal situation of debtor countries should therefore be included in debt sustainability analyses, even though data on government revenues and expenditures tend to be very poor in LICs. A further obstacle is the diffi culty involved in comparing the fi scal data of centralised and decentralised countries.
Similarly, private-sector external debt should be considered if it plays a major role. Private-sector external debt is often important in countries with large mineral or natural resource sectors. Some countries, e.g. Bolivia, Chad, Guyana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda, rely heavily on infl ows of private-sector capital; the external debt they owe to private-sector creditors should therefore be included in the analysis of their debt sustainability.
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In addition to these quantitative indicators, qualitative indicators could be taken into account as well. First, the debt sustainability analysis should consider the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), because achieving these goals is crucial to reducing poverty. Debt sustainability under the HIPC Initiative should therefore be analysed with a view to identifying the fi nancial resources needed by each country to achieve the MDGs. However, it will be diffi cult both to gauge whether MDGs have been achieved and to fi nance the costs of achieving them. 18 Second, the quality of institutions and economic policy should be considered, because countries with better institutions can service higher debts than those with institutions that do not perform well. The World Bank uses the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)-index for this purpose which includes four areas:
• economic management, e.g. fi scal policy, management of external debt etc.
• structural policies, e.g. fi nancial stability, competitive environment for the private sector etc.
• policies for social inclusion and equity, e.g. social protection and labour, building human resources etc.
• public sector management and institutions, e.g. property rights and rule-based governance, quality of budgetary and fi nancial management etc.
However, it is diffi cult to measure the quality of institutions. Therefore, to include qualitative indicators in the assessment of debt sustainability carries some risks.
Debt Situation after the Enhanced HIPC Initiative
Although debt has been substantially reduced after enhanced HIPC relief, debt sustainability has not been achieved for the long term. According to IMF estimates, the NPV of the debt-to-exports ratio before enhanced HIPC relief was 274% in the 27 countries that had reached their decision points. According to IMF and World Bank estimates, this ratio will be 128% at the completion point in 2005 after enhanced HIPC relief. After full delivery of traditional debt relief and assistance under the HIPC Initiative, the debt stocks of the 27 HIPCs that have reached the decision point will probably decline by about two thirds in 2003 NPV terms. 19 Similarly, debt service-to-exports ratios have been considerably reduced: based on an average of 1998/ 1999 to 2003, the weighted average of this ratio in the 27 countries fell from 16% to about 10%. During this period debt-service payments in relation to fi scal revenues declined from 24 to 15%. 20 The German government has contributed nearly €6 billion toward meeting the Initiative's overall costs of roughly US $53 billion.
Even though these aggregate data cast the HIPC Initiative in a highly positive light, some individual countries are still faced with ratios of debt to export earnings of over 150%, which exceeds the limit for debt sustainability set by the IMF and World Bank under the HIPC Initiative. 17 See Matthew M a r t i n : Assessing the HIPC-Initiative: The Key HIPC-debates, in: Jan J. Te u n i s s e n , Age A k k e r m a n (eds. This is true of the following HIPC graduates: Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Benin, Nicaragua, Mauritania and Uganda (Table 1) . Since 2001, when it was provided with debt relief, this ratio has risen constantly in Bolivia and is expected by the IMF and World Bank to reach a level of roughly 160% in 2006. The World Bank and the IMF estimated that in the interim period 7 of the 13 HIPCs that have not yet graduated will once again be faced with a situation of unsustainable debt, i.e. in excess of the debt sustainability thresholds defi ned within the HIPC Initiative. 21 In other countries, e.g. Tanzania, Senegal, Guyana and Mali, debt relief substantially reduced this ratio, and it has not risen sharply since they graduated. By contrast, debt-service payments in terms of exports and fi scal revenues declined substantially in most HIPCs.
Factors Endangering Debt Sustainability
The main threats to debt sustainability in HIPCs were, fi rst, exogenous shocks and, second, structural problems. High debt levels following completion of the Initiative are for the most part the result of exogenous shocks 22 which have caused a decline in export earnings and therefore often adversely affected the external repayment capacity of HIPCs. The term exogenous shock refers to the occurrence of a sudden event that is beyond the control of the competent authorities and has severe impacts on the economy. In LICs the most frequent events of this kind are commodity price shocks, natural disasters and exchange-rate shocks.
Due to structural weaknesses, which include in particular an underdiversifi ed economic structure and a lack of export diversifi cation, HIPCs are vulnerable to exogenous shocks. In 1999 nearly two thirds of the HIPC countries qualifying for the Initiative achieved over 50% of their export earnings with three products or fewer. 23 Moreover, LDCs principally export primary goods: in the late 1990s primary goods accounted for over 60% of the total exports of LDCs. 24 Most of these goods are agricultural products, which are dependent on climatic conditions and therefore highly vulnerable to natural disasters.
A classic example of high debt stemming from exogenous shocks is Burkina Faso, where falling cotton prices and the white fl y pest led to a decline in cotton exports. This had a marked impact on the country's total exports because cotton accounted for an average of some 40% of the country's total exports between 1999 and 2001. Political instabilities in Côte d'Ivoire, one of Burkina Faso's neighbours, likewise contributed to a decline in that country's exports. 25 Furthermore, fl uctuations in exchange and interests rates led to a higher level of foreign debt than was anticipated.
Uganda experienced a similar trend when it was confronted with a higher than expected debt due to declining commodity prices in world markets. In Ethiopia the unexpected increase in the NPV of the debtto-export ratio after full debt relief under the HIPC Initiative was caused mainly by adverse interest-and exchange-rate changes. In late 2002 and early 2003 this ratio was projected at 174%, and it rose to 218% in 2004.
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Contribution of the HIPC-Initiative to the Solution of Structural Problems
Due to structural problems HIPCs are unable to generate suffi cient internal resources to reduce poverty; the chief reason for this is that internal conditions -such as unstable macroeconomic frameworks, underdeveloped enterprise and fi nancial sectors, and lack of good governance and appropriate jurisdiction -are not in place. 21 Ibid. 22 See Kathrin B e r e n s m a n n , op. cit. While debt relief itself only addresses the symptoms, not the causes, of development blockades, economic reforms play a particularly important role in achieving long term repayment capacity. It is for this reason that the HIPC initiative makes debt relief contingent on economic and political reforms designed to ensure an HIPC country's ability to repay its loans.
To reach the so-called completion point -i.e. to receive debt relief -HIPC countries are required, fi rst, to set up, and run for at least a year, a poverty reduction programme based on a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and, second, to achieve macroeconomic stability. Credits in the framework of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) are only granted if HIPCs can demonstrate that they are implementing reforms designed to guarantee macroeconomic stability. Third, HIPCs are required to implement some additional structural reforms in the framework of what is known as the social and structural completion point triggers, which are designed to promote pro-poor growth and ensure that HIPCs increase their spending for poverty reduction measures. The triggers include e.g. policy measures in the fi elds of governance, budget management, health, education, and agricultural reform.
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This long-term conditioning of debt relief on national poverty reduction strategies (PRSPs) is intended to pave the way for sustainable successes in poverty reduction. The initiative in this way forges a close link between poverty reduction and debt relief. And it is precisely in this respect that the Initiative has made some progress: the World Bank and the IMF estimate that GDP-linked expenditures for poverty reduction measures have risen by roughly one third in the past fi ve years. 28 It should, however, be noted here that these are only aggregate data on expenditures for poverty reduction measures.
In general, it is too early to come up with any fi nal evaluation, although it can be said that structural problems have been addressed only in part. Although spending increases in social sectors such as education or health promote growth in the long term, pro-poor growth measures have been given too little consideration. Due to the uniform requirements of PRSPs and PRGFs, too little attention has been paid to the specifi c situations of the countries concerned. In addition, the coordination of PRSPs und PRGFs needs to be improved as a means of better coordinating micro-and macroeconomic policy reforms. 29 However, structural problems have existed for decades, and PRSPs and PRGFs are unable to overcome these problems in the short or medium term. HIPCs will for this reason not be able to generate suffi cient fi nancial resources to reduce poverty and to achieve the MDGs by 2015. After all, even low debt service has to be refi nanced through Offi cial Development Assistance (ODA).
Proposals for Ensuring Debt Sustainability
Four proposals for ensuring debt sustainability in low-income countries dominate the current debate:
• the "Debt Sustainability Framework in Low-Income Countries" proposed by the IMF and World Bank
• two proposals for 100% debt relief by multilateral institutions made by the American and British fi nance ministers
• the International Finance Facility (IFF) to fi nance grants instead of credits endangering debt sustainability
• new IMF fi nancial instruments designed to mitigate exogenous shocks.
Since the creation of another HIPC Initiative -HIPC III -might discourage creditors from lending to lowincome countries in general -because it could generate debtor moral hazard -most stakeholders reject a future HIPC III.
New Debt Sustainability Framework
At their annual meetings this year, the IMF and the World Bank put forward a proposal for ensuring debt sustainability in low-income countries -the Debt Sustainability Framework in Low-Income Countries -which had already been proposed in a different form at the spring meetings this year. This framework is intended to offer low-income countries and their creditors guidance on the design of fi nancing strategies with a view to ensuring debt sustainability. 30 The framework incorporates the following characteristics. 27 See Amar B h a t t a c h a r y a : From Debt Relief to Achieving MDGs, in: Jan J. Te u n i s s e n , Age A k k e r m a n (eds.), op. cit., pp. • First, the framework includes an analysis of debt sustainability based on the adoption of indicative country-specifi c debt thresholds. One important factor affecting debt problems is a country's economic policy performance. An assessment of the quality of a country's economic policy and institutions is therefore included in the framework. This analysis is based on the World Bank's CPIA index. Good performers, for example, could carry a higher debt burden than bad performers.
• Second, a uniform forward-looking analysis of debt burden (debt and debt service) by the IMF and the World Bank -in a baseline scenario and in a situation of potential shocks -is included in the framework. It is, however, crucial for them to base their decisions on realistic assumptions on macroeconomic data -especially growth rates. While the HIPC Initiative deals with existing overindebtedness, this framework offers forward-looking guidance.
• Third, the aim of the framework is to provide guidance on an appropriate borrowing (lending) strategy for bilateral and multilateral donors which includes the risk of debt distress. The indicative thresholds for debt indicators are intended to warn creditors and borrowers when there is a danger that a country's debt may become unsustainable.
The framework will be included in the operations of the World Bank and the IMF. The grant element in IDA 14 should, for example, be based on the analysis included in the debt-sustainability framework, and the Fund plans to include the framework in its conditionality.
In general, the framework is superior to the Debt Sustainability Analysis under the HIPC Initiative. While the same thresholds for debt indicators were used for all HIPCs under the HIPC Initiative, the new framework uses indicative country-specifi c debt thresholds. This makes possible a country-specifi c analysis. In addition, a wider range of debt indicators is used, including an assessment of the quality of economic policy and institutions (CPIA index). In contrast to the HIPC Initiative, which has addressed existing debt problems, the operational framework is forward-looking.
There are, however, two main critical points. Domestic debt should also be taken into account as a threshold, and not only in the general debt sustainability analysis, because the fi nancial resources mobilised to pay off domestic debt are in this case no longer available for servicing foreign debt.
US Treasury Secretary John Snow and others criticised the framework for being unable to ensure long-term debt sustainability in HIPCs; in particular, they noted, debt thresholds are too high. The threshold for the debt to export ratio for good performers is 300%, i.e. twice as high as the threshold under the HIPC-Initiative, and the threshold for debt service in terms of revenues is 40%. At the annual meetings of the Bretton Woods institutions, the American Treasury Secretary and the British Chancellor of the Exchequer put forward two different proposals for reducing HIPC debt owed to multilateral institutions. 31 While bilateral donors grant HIPCs 100% debt relief, multilateral donors cancel only about 50% or less of their debts.
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The US Proposal for 100% Debt Relief
The US Treasury Secretary called on the following multilateral fi nancial institutions to grant HIPCs a 100% debt write-off: IMF, IDA, African Development Fund (AfDF) at the African Development Bank Group. Debt relief is necessary to ensure the sustainability needed to ensure economic growth and poverty reduction. He also proposed that graduated HIPCs should receive 100% grants from the IDA facility and the AfDF until 2015. Net resources to HIPCs should at least remain constant and it should be left open whether net resources should increase.
While this proposal would help to ensure debt sustainability in HIPCs, it has, basically, the following drawbacks. It is not appropriate to provide non-graduated HIPCs a 100% debt write off without their having implemented any structural reforms. Debt relief alone does not solve structural problems and therefore cannot ensure debt sustainability. For this reason the HIPC Initiative makes debt relief contingent on economic and political reforms.
Similarly, it is not specifi ed according to which performance system resources would be allocated to graduated HIPCs. The Debt Sustainability Framework proposed by the Bretton Woods Institutions is not considered, but this framework is appropriate for deciding on the relative composition of loans and grants because it takes into account structural reforms, governance and the development of institutions. In addition, debt relief to HIPCs would entail moralhazard problems because good performers with sustainable debt levels which had not qualifi ed for the HIPC Initiative would not be eligible for a 100% debt write off. Moreover, repayment of loans provides an incentive for using fi nancial resources effi ciently.
Unless net fi nancial resources for low-income countries were increased substantially, HIPCs would receive more money than other low-income countries. This would mean a reallocation of net fi nancial resources in favour of the HIPCs.
Moreover, it will prove to be diffi cult to fi nance debt relief. Unless additional fi nancial resources are mobilised, the fi nancial solidity of the IDA and PRGF facilities could be endangered, i.e. these facilities would be decapitalised over time. In contrast to loans, grants weaken these facilities' ability to offer future development assistance. The position of IMF and World Bank relative to other bilateral and multilateral donors would be weakened.
The British Proposal for 100% Debt Relief
The British proposal calls for 100% debt relief by multilateral donors, to be fi nanced with additional resources. IMF gold could also be revalued, since it is currently valued by the IMF at about one eighth of its market value, from about US$ 50 billion to US$ 400 billion. 100% debt relief within the PRGF would in this case be fi nanced through a revaluation of IMF gold as well as through off-market transactions. 100% debt relief on the loans granted by the World Bank and the African Development Bank would have to be fi nanced by commitments from all donors.
The UK is prepared to meet 10% of the graduated HIPCs' debt to the World Bank and the African Development Bank. In addition, the UK would extend debt relief to all LICs able to guarantee that the money saved would be used to reduce poverty.
There are two main arguments against this proposal. First, many bilateral donors are faced with fi scal constraints and will not, therefore, be able to provide additional funds for the HIPCs or other low-income countries. Second, fi nancing the PRGF with IMF gold would be possible only if that gold was undervalued compared with the market price. The fi nancing of the PRGF would in this case be dependent on the world market price of gold.
On the whole, conditions should be attached to 100% debt relief, and the debt sustainability framework mentioned above should be used to assess the optimal amount of loans relative to grants. Nevertheless, grants to LICs have to be increased relative to loans for ensuring debt sustainability.
The IDA-13 agreements reached in 2002 may be seen as a step in this direction. The agreements provide for loans to the HIPC countries which may in certain cases contain a grant element of up to 40%. Debt sustainability is an important criterion for access to IDA loans; in other words, the lower a country's debt sustainability, the higher must be the grant element of the loans with which it is provided. Moreover, debt sustainability is set to play a central role in the IDA-14 agreements. The debt sustainability analysis proposed in 2004 by the IMF and World Bank 33 will infl uence the decisions made on IDA-14 loans.
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Proposals for Mobilising Financial Resources
Various proposals have been put forward for multilateral donors to fi nance 100% debt relief and to fi nance grants for LICs to achieve their MDGs by 2015: imposition of world-wide taxes on capital movements, pollution, or arms exports, issuing SDRs for development purposes, global lottery, establishment of an International Finance Facility (IFF), and an increase in net Offi cial Development Aid (ODA) amounting to 0.7% of donors' GDP, which was one of the commitments made at the Monterrey conference in 2002. 35 Although some of them are very old, no international agreement on these proposals exists. Basically, freerider problems would make it very diffi cult to enforce any world-wide tax. The most promising proposal is for an IFF, which was again put forward by the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, at the annual meeting of the Bretton Woods institutions this year.
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The general principle is that donors would be indebted in international capital markets for generating grants to LICs. Donors commit themselves in the long term to providing the IFF with capital. On this basis The IFF would operate as follows: donors would commit themselves to providing fi nance in the future. Since their commitments would serve as backing for bonds, they could have an AAA rating. The bonds would be issued in the international fi nancial markets by an existing institution. Grants would be given to developing countries through existing bilateral and multilateral donor channels. Each donor allocates his committed funds according to overarching principles agreed upon by donors at the establishment of an IFF.
The IFF would front-load aid commitments of bilateral donors by raising suffi cient fi nancial resources to meet MDGs by 2015. The IFF would annually issue bonds, for example, with repayment periods of 15 years for a period of 10 to 15 years. Financial resources would immediately be transferred to LICs, but donors would have to pay for the bonds only within the next 15 to 30 years. Accordingly, donors could provide immediately fi nancial resources for LICs, but have to pay for them when bonds become due.
According to Gordon Brown, there are several sound arguments for the IFF. This facility would leverage additional funds from international fi nancial markets increasing the amount of ODA for the years to 2015. In addition, the IFF would improve aid effectiveness because its funding levels would be predictable, stable, long-term and coordinated, and the funds could therefore be used continuously for poverty reduction and sustainable growth. Since it would be financed by a small number of countries this core group would have few coordination problems.
Although this is the best of the current proposals, it has three major drawbacks. First, although donors would have only future fi nancing obligations, these would currently be future liabilities which would have to be considered in the donors' state budgets. Many industrialised countries are, however, faced with serious fi scal problems and will not therefore agree to the IFF. Second, the front-loading of aid commitments is justifi ed only if the fi nancial resources which low-income countries receive from the IFF generate economic growth and resolve structural diffi culties in those countries. Third, it is questionable whether these bonds will be accepted in international capital markets.
New IMF Financial Instruments for LICs
Since exogenous shocks constitute a substantial risk to the debt sustainability of LICs, the multilateral donors should help to mitigate the impacts of such shocks. The fi nancial instruments of the international fi nancial institutions, and especially of the IMF, need to be modifi ed, because the instruments designed to mitigate exogenous shocks have had only limited success.
Currently, the IMF has two facilities for addressing the effects of exogenous shocks: the Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF) and emergency-assistance loans. For shocks due to natural disasters, the IMF provides emergency-assistance loans, which are disbursed quickly and granted in the medium term to countries with balance-of-payments problems.
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The aim of the IMF's CFF is to provide medium-term compensation for temporary shortfalls in export earnings or for surplus grain imports needed to respond to exogenous shocks. It has not, however, been used since the year 2000 38 because it is available only in the medium term, a considerable number of conditions are attached, and the loans provided are not concessional in nature.
To absorb external shocks, the IMF generally provides either additional stand-by arrangements or PRGF loans, which are not designed explicitly to mitigate exogenous shocks in the short term. Stand-by arrangements are designed to provide medium term support for countries facing short term balance-ofpayments problems. However, while stand-by arrangements meet the fi rst two criteria for an instrument suited to mitigating exogenous shocks, the loans are not provided on concessional terms: the interest rates on them are one to two percentage points above the base rate. The PRGF is designed to provide long term support for countries faced with persistent structural balance-of-payments problems and to promote sustainable, pro-poor growth. 39 Since the IMF lacks an instrument for providing short term loans to help mitigate exogenous shocksespecially commodity-price or currency shocks -new facilities need to be developed. They should meet the following criteria: 40 • highly concessional credits: since LICs are likely to have problems repaying loans on market terms, the loans should have a high degree of concessionality;
• short-term availability: the instruments should be made available quickly and without any complicated procedures;
• medium-term repayment period: to give the countries affected a chance to recover from a shock, the subsidised loans should be repayable over the medium term.
The IMF could, for example, develop a facility containing a fl exible element for payment terms when a borrower country is adversely affected by an external shock. To this end, it would be possible to convert part of such loans into a grant, to lower interest rates, or to prolong repayment periods. The IMF would have to defi ne criteria for determining the conditions under which countries were eligible to borrow from such facilities and how much they might borrow. 41 If commodity prices fell by more than 15%, it would be conceivable, for example, for payments on part of the loans to be deferred or for part of the loans to be converted into grants.
An automatic mechanism of this kind that triggered a fl exible element would enable repayment terms to be altered quickly and on the basis of transparent rules. This would, however, entail the risk of the debtor seeking to infl uence to his own advantage criteria that would trigger a change in his repayment terms. In addition, it carries the risk that producers would not be encouraged to diversify their production, as under Stabex.
Nevertheless, there is a need for a new facility that contains a fl exible element relating to payment terms when external shocks occur, since the countries affected are best able to mitigate the effects of shocks when they have swift access to fi nancial support.
Conclusion
Owing to their diffi cult economic structures, most low-income countries will be, in the medium term at least, dependent on subsidies from donors. What is needed to ensure long-term debt sustainability is more grants and more concessional credits which could be fi nanced by the IFF. Otherwise, these countries will not achieve their Millenium Development Goals and will again fi nd themselves faced with unsustainable debt levels.
Due to fi nancial diffi culties it will be not possible, however, for multilateral institutions to offer 100% debt relief. If additional grants are provided, conditions should be attached to them, and the debt sustainability framework mentioned above should be adopted to analyse the optimal amount of loans relative to grants.
The operational framework is appropriate to evaluate debt sustainability and to address structural problems in low-income countries as well as to decide on the relative composition of loans and grants. This framework should, however, obtain only for graduated HIPCs and other LICs, and not for HIPCs in the interim phase of the HIPC process, because these countries should fi rst complete the Initiative under current conditions. In case debt relief committed at the decision is not suffi cient to reach debt sustainability according to the criteria valid under the HIPC Initiative, topping off should be granted. Any 100% debt relief for HIPCs in the interim phase would undermine the HIPC process.
